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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

GILBERT LORETTO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960622-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered July 23, 1996.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err by refusing to strike

the jury panel after they heard prejudicial remarks by a
prospective juror that Loretto's hair and clothing styles were
like those of Mexican gang members?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's decision to grant

or deny a motion for a mistrial will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion.

State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah

Ct. App. 1992).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel moved to strike

the jury panel based on the prejudicial nature of the juror's
remarks about Appellant's hair and clothing.
ISSUE II:

R. 271.

Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction based upon accomplice liability in the absence of any

evidence that Appellant contributed to the commission of the
robbery other than his presence at the scene of the crime?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court will reverse a criminal

case for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel moved to dismiss

at the close of the State's case on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence to establish accomplice liability.
ISSUE III:

R. 354.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error

by giving the jury an instruction containing the statutory
definition of robbery in addition to an elements instruction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
the

The trial court's instructions to

jury are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference.

Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine,
when considered as a whole, whether they fairly instruct the jury
on the applicable law.

Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003,

1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel objected to

Instruction 14 on the grounds that it was repetitive and unfairly
emphasized certain aspects of the case.
ISSUE IV:

R. 362-63.

Did the trial court err by refusing to provide

the jury with a reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction
because the reasonable doubt instruction did not adequately
2

define the concept, minimized the importance of reasonable doubt,
and suggested that the jury could convict on less evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
the

The trial court's instructions to

jury are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference.

Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine,
when considered as a whole, whether they fairly instruct the jury
on the applicable law.

Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1006.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel submitted a

reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction and objected to the
reasonable doubt instruction on the grounds that it did not
adequately define the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
R. 361-62.
ISSUE V:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by

refusing to grant defense counsel's motion to continue the trial
because she had only just received information regarding a
potential defense witness's whereabouts and needed additional
time to interview him?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's denial of a motion

to continue is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

State v.

Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel requested a

continuance on May 31, 1996 on the grounds that she had recently
discovered information that could lead to the whereabouts of a
potential defense witness.

R. 192-94.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
3

The pertinent parts of the following constitutional
provisions and statutes are contained in Addendum A:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 6, 1996, the Appellant, Gilbert Loretto
("Loretto" or "Appellant") was convicted of aggravated robbery,
in violation of
felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), a first degree

On July 23, 1996, Judge Frank Noel sentenced Appellant

to serve five years to life at the Utah State Prison, pay a
$1,000.00 fine and 85% surcharge, and $300.00 recoupment fee.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on August 1, 1996.

The Utah

Supreme Court poured over disposition of Loretto's appeal to this
Court on September 27, 1996.
FACTS
On January 10, 1995 Carrie Flores ("Flores") was robbed
at knife point in the parking lot of the Smith's supermarket on
7800 South State Street.

Just prior to the robbery, Flores

bought groceries and paid with a $50.00 bill. R. 305. While she
was in line, she noticed three Hispanic men in line behind her.
4

Flores identified Loretto as one of the three men who were behind
her at the check out stand.

R. 3 04.

After paying for her

groceries, Flores left the store and walked to her car which was
parked about 40-50 feet away from the store.

R. 305-307.

Flores

put the groceries in the passenger side of the vehicle and walked
around to the driver's side of the vehicle.

R. 306-307.

The

three men, including Loretto, were standing directly in front of
her.

R. 306.

One man was holding a knife.

away from her.

He was about a foot

Loretto stood directly behind and to the right of

the man with the knife, less than a foot away from Flores.
307-08.

R.

The third man was standing behind and directly to the

left of the man with the knife.

R. 3 07. The man with the knife

held the three inch blade about four inches from her chest, and
demanded that she give him the change from the 50.00 bill.
308-09.

R.

Flores heard Loretto either laughing or mumbling, she

could not tell which.
knife the money.
a photo spread.

R. 3 09.

R. 310-11.
R. 311-12.

Flores gave the man with the

Later Flores identified Loretto in
Loretto did not threaten Flores,

verbally encourage the man with knife, brandish a weapon, or take
the money.

R. 311, 316-19.

|

Sherman Lloyd with the Midvale Police Department was
working off duty at Smiths, knows Loretto and saw him with two
other Hispanic males that evening.

R. 299-300.

Melissa Larez,

("Larez") a Smith's employee, knows Loretto and his home address.
Larez remembered chatting with Loretto while he stood in line
with the other men behind Flores.
5

R. 333-37.

Larez said Loretto

mostly paid attention to her and not the others while waiting in
line.

R. 326-27.

Larez testified that Loretto had come in the

store on prior occasions.

R. 337.

In fact,

Officer Roxburgh

with the Midvale Police Department arrested Loretto for this
offense at the same Smith's store two days later.

R. 343.

Sherry Burbidge, a cashier at Smiths, also testified that
she recalled checking Flores' groceries.

R. 326-27.

She

remembered seeing Loretto with two other Hispanic men in line
behind Flores.

R. 328.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

During voir dire, a prospective juror stated that she was
biased against Loretto because he was the same age as her son who
had recently committed suicide and because his hair and clothing
styles were like those of a Mexican neighbor involved in gangs.
The trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to grant
defense counsel's motion to strike the panel.
comments were prejudicial for two reasons.

The juror's

One, jurors may have

been influenced by her strong, emotional expressions of bias, and
two, the jurors heard what amounted to outside evidence regarding
hair and clothing styles of Mexican gang members.

The trial

court's single question to jurors asking if they could be fair
was inadequate to remedy the taint.

Because the jury heard

extraneous evidence, there is a presumption of prejudice.
Loretto was also actually prejudiced by the remarks because he is
an Hispanic male who was accused of aiding and abetting in the
commission of a robbery by two other Mexican men.
6

There was insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of
guilty based on accomplice liability.

The only evidence that

Loretto was a party to the crime was his close proximity to the
robber and victim during the commission of the offense.

Mere

presence at the scene of a crime where the actor contributes
nothing to the doing of the act is insufficient to establish
accomplice liability.
The trial court committed prejudicial error by giving the
jury an instruction defining the offense of robbery in addition
to the elements instruction.
repetitious instructions.

The State was not entitled to

Loretto was prejudiced because the

repetition of the elements of the crime emphasized that aspect of
the case and minimized the more important issue of whether there
was sufficient evidence to find him guilty as an accomplice to
the crime.
The trial court should have granted Appellant's request
for a reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction because the
reasonable doubt instruction was confusing, misleading, and did
not adequately define the concept.

Appellant should be granted a

new trial because the reasonable doubt instruction could have
been applied by jurors in a way that violates the Constitution.
The instruction implies that the defendant is guilty and that
proof of guilt must be merely satisfactory.

The instruction as a

whole tends to minimize the State's burden of proof and
discourages the jury from attempting to apply the concept of
reasonable doubt to the evidence.
7

The trial court abused its discretion by

refusing to

grant defense counsel a continuance five days prior to trial.

It

was abuse of discretion to deny the request for continuance on
the grounds that counsel could not proffer what the proposed
witness's testimony would be, when counsel had only just received
information that could aid in locating the witness, and was
requesting additional time so she could interview him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I, THE ENTIRE JURY PANEL WAS TAINTED BY A
PROSPECTIVE JUROR'S STATEMENT DURING VOIR DIRE
THAT APPELLANT'S HAIR AND CLOTHING STYLE WERE
LIKE THOSE OF MEXICAN GANG MEMBERS.
During voir dire, a prospective juror, Ms. Bingham, gave
unsolicited information regarding her son who had recently
committed suicide.

Ms. Bingham told the court she was prejudiced

by seeing a young man, and that she was "an emotional basket
case." R.

211-212.

When asked if she could concentrate on the

case and evaluate the evidence, Ms. Bingham replied:
I'm a very emotional person. We live next door
to a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs and
he--he dressed just like he did. I can't
understand. Why can't he shave that thing off
the back of his head? I'm sorry. I don't know
if I could be fair. (The jury (sic) was
referring to the defendant at this point).
R. 211-232.

The juror was referring to Loretto's hair style

which was longer at the back of the neck.
Loretto is Hispanic.
panel.

R. 2 71.

R. 272-73.

Mr.

R. 3 04. Defense counsel moved to quash the

The court denied the motion to quash the panel,

but agreed to question the panel about Ms. Bingham's comments.
8

R. 275.

The court asked the panel if anyone felt "they were

influenced by those comments of Mrs. Bingham in a way that would
make it difficult for them to be fair and impartial, based upon
her comments?"

R. 281.

No one responded.

did not ask any additional questions.

R. 281.

R. 281.

The court

See Addendum B

for a copy of the portions of the transcript cited above.
Ms. Bingham's remarks presented the court with a two
fold problem.

One, the panel heard outside evidence that Mexican

gang members who lived by Ms. Bingham wore clothing and hair
styles like Loretto. Second, the panel may have reacted to and
identified with Ms. Bingham's bias and also felt some bias
towards Loretto.

The trial court's questioning of the

prospective jurors after he had denied defense counsel's motion
to quash the panel was an inadequate remedy.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
and Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution require that the
jury's verdict be based on evidence received in court and not
from outside sources.

Sheppard v. Maxwell,

384 U.S. 333, 351,

86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959).

Both

the Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee trial by an
impartial jury. State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985) .1
In this case, the jury heard what amounted to outside
evidence that Loretto's hair and clothing styles were like those
1

.
The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution.
9

worn by Mexican gang members.

Evidence that Mexican gang members

wore hair and clothing styles like Loretto would not have been
admissible at trial had the State tried to introduce it under
Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it was
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.2
The trial court's additional voir dire did nothing to
alleviate the problem of having the jury hear outside evidence
that was not subject to cross examination, objection,
explanation, or rebuttal.

The single question asked by the court

was inadequate to eliminate the taint from Ms. Bingham's remarks.
See State v Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980) (one question
is not sufficient to rebut an inference of bias); State v.
Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (simply asking
one question to jurors who had been victims of similar crime to
charged crime error); State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (trial court's simple repetition of admonishment
and plea to be fair insufficient). Cf Morgan, 865 P.2d at 1381
(no error where the court extensively questioned each individual
juror about potential influence of juror's expression of bias

2

.
This case is distinguishable from State v. Morgan, 865
P. 2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In Morgan, a juror made an
inappropriate comment suggesting that he was predisposed to find
the defendant guilty to another juror who reported the incident.
After dismissing the juror, the court questioned individually each
remaining juror. Only one juror overheard the comment, and after
"careful inquiry" the court determined that both jurors were not
influenced by the improper statement. Id. at 1381.
The court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing the defendant's motion for a mistrial. JEd. Unlike this
case, the jurors in Morgan were not exposed to outside information
that could have a bearing on the case.
10

against the defendant) .
Also, the jurors were not in a position at the outset of
the trial to determine if Ms. Bingham's remarks would affect
their judgment because they were not aware of the facts of the
case at that time.

The jurors couldn't have known before the

trial started that the information about Loretto's appearance
might prove to be related to the facts and issues of the case.
They did not know that the crucial issue in the case would be
whether Loretto was a party to a robbery committed by two other
Mexican males.

For that reason, their assessment of their own

impartiality at that point in time had little value.
Once jurors have been exposed to improper outside
influences, the jurors' denial that they were influenced is not
sufficient to dispel the possibility of prejudice because the
"person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to
recognize that fact."

Pike, 712 P.2d at 280-81.

When "jurors

have received extra-record information that bears upon the trial,
a protestation of nonprejudicial effect by the juror may not be
enough to protect the integrity of the judicial process."
v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 1983).

State

See also. State

v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (presumption
of prejudice from improper contact between victim and juror was
not overcome by court's cursory questioning and juror's assertion
that she was not influenced); Marshall, 79 S.Ct. at 1173, 360
U.S. at 312-13 (reversing the conviction because jurors received
inadmissible information about the defendant's criminal record
11

from the newspaper despite the jurors' assertion to the trial
court that they could be fair).
The trial court erred by refusing to grant counsel's
motion to strike the panel.

Loretto's constitutional rights to

an impartial jury and a trial free from outside influence were
violated.

The single question asked by the court did nothing to

remedy the taint of Ms. Bingham's remarks.
A. THE INTRODUCTION OF OUTSIDE EVIDENCE
REGARDING LORETTO'S MANNER OF DRESS AND HAIRSTYLE
CREATES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE.
Utah cases involving a juror's exposure to outside
evidence do not reach the issue of whether such exposure creates
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.

See Velasquez, 672 P.2d

at 1264, Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6, 7 (Utah 1975).

In Velasquez

and Gee jurors were exposed to outside evidence.

In both cases

the outside evidence was no different than evidence that had
already been properly admitted at trial so there was no question
of prejudice.
However, in cases involving jurors who have improperly
had contact with a State's witness, the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted a stringent analysis under Article I, section 10 of the
Utah Constitution which presumes prejudice.

Once the presumption

of prejudice is raised, the burden is on the State to prove that
the juror was not influenced.
P.2d at 1011.

Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; Swain, 835

The same presumption of prejudice arises in cases

where a juror does independent investigation of the crime during

12

the trial.

State v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786, 787-88 (Utah 1971). 3

These cases suggest that the presumption of prejudice should also
apply to cases where jurors are exposed to outside evidence.

In

fact, both Hawaii and California apply a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice in cases where jurors hear extraneous evidence.
State v. Joseph, 883 P.2d 657, 660 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994); In re
Malone, 911 P.2d 468, 486-87 (Cal. 1996). 4
The reasoning behind presuming prejudice in Pike, Ahrens,
and their progeny applies with equal force in this situation.
Pike identified two reasons for the existence of
the rebuttable presumption. First, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove how an
improper contact may have influenced a juror. . .
The second reason for the presumption is that an
improper juror contact creates an appearance of
collusion or impropriety in the proceedings from
which the judicial process may suffer in the eyes
of the public. If improper juror contact is not
prevented, a doubt may exist in the mind of the
losing party, and the public as a whole, as to
whether the defendant was given a fair trial.
Swain, 835 P.2d at 1011.
The problem of proving the influence on jurors when they
hear extraneous information which is related to the case is
3

. Ahrens does not specifically state that the court applied
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. But the Ahrens court noted
that there was no way of knowing if the juror who had done outside
investigation of the crime was influenced.
Citing to State v.
Anderson, 237 P. 941, 65 Utah 415 (1925) and State v. Crank, 142
P.2d 178, 105 Utah 332 (1943), the court reversed the conviction.
Anderson and Crank were the cases relied upon by the court in Pike
which applied a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
4

. Both California and Hawaii treat cases where jurors were
exposed to extraneous information as structural errors which
undermined the integrity of the trial and therefore do not apply a
harmless error analysis. Malone, 911 P. 2d at 486-87; Joseph, 883
P.2d at 660.
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equally as great.

Ahrens recognized that when a juror conducts

his own investigation and as a consequence may have relied on
outside evidence in reaching a verdict, there is no way of
determining whether the juror's judgment was influenced.

479

P.2d at 787.
Lastly, "[T]he verdict of the jury, like Caesar's wife,
must be above suspicion."

Crank, 142 P.2d at 194.

When jurors

are allowed to hear information which is not presented as part of
the trial and is therefore not subject to rebuttal, crossexamination, or objection, the appearance of the fairness of the
proceedings is undermined both in the eyes of the defendant and
the public.
Because a rebuttable presumption of prejudice attaches,
the State has the burden of showing that the extraneous
information did not influence the jury.

The State cannot

overcome the presumption of prejudice which arose from Ms.
Bingham's remarks.
B. THE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OF MS. BINGHAM'S
STATEMENTS WAS SO GREAT THAT EVEN IF THERE IS NO
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE HE SHOULD BE GRANTED A
NEW TRIAL.
Ms. Bingham informed the jury that she had a Mexican
neighbor who was involved in gangs and who wore clothing and hair
styles similar to Loretto.

Loretto is Hispanic.

The sole issue

in his case was whether he was a party to the robbery which was
committed by two Mexican men.

The jurors were asked to determine

if Loretto was a participant, or just an observer.
14

The fact

that, according to Ms. Bingham, Loretto looked like a Mexican
gang member could easily have influenced their perception of him.
Given the nature of the facts and issues of this case there is a
substantial risk that the jury may have concluded that this was a
gang related robbery and that Loretto was a gang member.

The

perception of Loretto as a gang member would have made it appear
more likely that he participated in the robbery.

Because Loretto

was acutally prejudiced by the court's failure to strike the
panel, he is entitled to new trial.
POINT II; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THAT LORETTO WAS A PARTY TO THE
OFFENSE.
This Court will reverse a criminal case for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."
Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

The evidence is reviewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict.
P.2d at 444.

Harman, 767 P.2d at 568; Petree, 659

The weight and credibility given to a witness's

testimony is an exclusive function of the trier of fact.

State

v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
Despite this high standard, every element of the offense
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The reviewing court

will not make a "speculative leap" to fill gaps in the evidence
in order to sustain the verdict.

Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45;

State in re J.S.H., 642 P.2d 386 (Utah 1982); State v. Kourbelas,
15

621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980). 5
Since there was no evidence that Loretto directly
committed the offense, the only issue was whether Loretto was
guilty as a party to the crime.

There was not sufficient

evidence to establish that Loretto was an accomplice to the
robbery.6
An accomplice is a person who knowingly,
voluntarily, and with common intent with the
principal offender, unites in the commission of
the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be
5

In order to sustain a challenge based on insufficient
evidence, the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting
the verdict, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
and demonstrate it is legally insufficient.
State v. Gray, 851
P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In order to be concise, only
the facts which are relevant to establishing Loretto's liability as
a party to the offense are repeated here. A full account of the
facts can be found in the Facts section of this brief. The
following evidence supported the verdict:
1.
Flores identified Loretto as being present at the
robbery. R. 3 06.
2 . Burbidge and Larez both stated Loretto was with the men
who committed the robbery when Flores paid for her groceries with
cash. R. 328, 333-37.
3. Flores was parked forty to fifty feet away from the
store. R. 305-07.
4.
Flores was confronted immediately after leaving the
store. R. 306.
5. Loretto was standing less than a foot away from Flores
when she was confronted by the man with the knife. R. 307-08.
6. Loretto was standing directly behind the man with the
knife. R. 307-08.
7. Flores stated that Loretto either laughed or mumbled to
himself during the robbery, but that she couldn't hear what he
said. R. 309.

6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 states:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
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real, not merely apparent. Mere presence
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to
be committed or a mental approbation while the
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act,
will not of itself constitute one an accomplice.
State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951).
State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993) provides an
example of the principle that in order to be guilty as an
accomplice, the defendant must actively participate in the
commission of the crime.

In Wood, the court held that the

evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Wood was an
accomplice to murder because he was close by the principal actor
during the beating, he kicked the victim while he was being
beaten to death, and there were wounds on the victim that looked
like they were inflicted by side cutters which were found on
Wood.

Id. at 87-88.
In contrast, the court found that there was not

sufficient evidence to support party liability to aggravated
sexual assault on the theory that Wood aided in the rape or
torture of the victim with battery clamps.

Id. at 88.

All the

testimony at trial indicated that Archuleta committed those acts
and there was not physical evidence to the contrary.

"Without

more, the fact that Wood was present during these crimes is not
enough to convict him of being an accomplice to those crimes."

Id.
But the court did find sufficient evidence to support
Wood's conviction as a party to aggravated sexual assault on the
theory that he participated in the object rape of the victim
17

because the evidence showed that while Archuleta committed the
object rape, Wood kicked the victim.

Id.

See also State v.

Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977) (mere presence at the scene
of a crime without intent is not sufficient to find that one is
an accomplice; State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972)
(presence at a crime with knowledge that the crime is about to be
committed where the person "contributes nothing to the doing of
the act" does not establish accomplice liability); State v.
Cellists, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987) (evidence that the defendant
was with the robber when he test drove the car that was used in
the robbery, and minutes after the robbery the defendant returned
the car to the lot was insufficient to establish accomplice
liability).
Applying the principles of accomplice liability
enunciated in Wood, Fertig, Helm, and Gee to the case at hand,
the only evidence suggesting that Loretto was an accomplice to
the crime was his close proximity to the victim and the man with
the knife.

Loretto was not blocking the victim's exit, he did

not verbally encourage the robber, he did not have a weapon, he
did not physically or verbally threaten the victim, and he did
not take the money.

R. 308-309, 319. Though he was with the

people who robbed Flores, there was no evidence that he knew what
was about to take place.

Indeed, the evidence suggested that he

did not as Loretto had shopped at that Smith's store more than
once in the past, and chatted with a sales clerk who knew his
name and address while he waited in line with the other men
18

behind Flores.

R. 320, 329, 334-38.

At trial, the State focused on the fact that Loretto
walked some fifty feet or so with the other men to Flores7 car.
R. 357.

The fact that Loretto walked with the other two men into

the parking lot to Flores' car does not establish that he knew
that they were going to rob her.

Loretto could have simply

followed the men he was with into the lot.

More importantly,

walking to Flores' car and standing close by while she was robbed
"contributes nothing to the doing of the act" of robbery.
498 P.2d at 665.

Gee,

Given the lack of evidence that Loretto

contributed in some concrete way to the commission of the
robbery, there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was
a party to the offense.
POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING THE

JURY AN INSTRUCTION WHICH STATED THE STATUTORY
DEFINITION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN ADDITION TO
THE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION
At the State's request, the trial court gave the
statutory definition of robbery to the jury in Instruction 14 in
addition to the elements instruction, number 15.
63.

R. 150-51, 362-

See Addendum C for copies of Instructions 14 and 15.

The

State was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the
elements of robbery twice.

In State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723,

725 (Utah 1982) the court held that the defendant was not
entitled to essentially two instructions on reasonable doubt
because repeating the instruction had the effect of
overemphasizing one point in the trial and was therefore
19

potentially misleading.

Similarly, in State v. McCumber, 622

P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980) the court held that "a defendant is not
entitled to an instruction which is redundant or repetitive of
principles enunciated in other instructions given to the jury."
Just as the defendant is not entitled to repetitious
instructions, the State is likewise not entitled to repetitious
instructions.

Repetition of a jury instruction tends to place

undue emphasis on a particular point or unduly highlight certain
evidence. State v. White, 658 P.2d 1111, 1115 (Mont. 1983).
Emphasizing one issue, theory or defense by repetition has the
added effect of minimizing the importance of other evidence and
issues.

White Auto Stores v. Reyes, 223 F.2d 298, 305 (10th Cir.

1955) .
In many cases, there would be little harm to the
defendant for the court to repeat the elements instruction of the
charged crime twice to the jury.

See United States v. Soria, 959

F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 882, 1135
S.Ct. 236, 121 L.Ed.2d 236 (1992) (repetition of instruction on
use of circumstantial evidence to show mental intent harmless
error).

In this case, however, the issue was not whether a

robbery was committed, but whether Loretto was an accomplice.
The repetition of the elements instruction was misleading because
it unduly emphasized the evidence going to the issue of whether a
robbery was committed, and minimized the importance of the
evidence going to the issue of whether Loretto aided in the
commission of the robbery.
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POINT IV: BECAUSE THE REASONABLE DOUBT
INSTRUCTION DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE
CONCEPT, WAS MISLEADING, AND CONFUSING, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH
A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION.
The reasonable doubt instruction given by the court fails
to explain the concept in any meaningful way.

This instruction

is not only confusing and misleading, but by virtue of the way it
is phrased and constructed, it minimizes the State's burden of
proof.

The following is the text of the reasonable doubt

instruction given in this case.

The sentences have been numbered

for easy reference.
(1) All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) And, in
case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his
guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to
an acquittal. (3) I have heretofore told you
that the burden is upon the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (4)
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require
proof to an absolute certainty.
(5) Now by
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based
on reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. (6) It must be a reasonable
doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or
imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility.
(7) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind,
convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it, and
obviates all reasonable doubt. (8) A reasonable
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women
would entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence or the lack of the evidence in this
case.
On its face, Instruction 6 does not appear to lessen the
State's burden of proof.

However, in construing a reasonable

doubt instruction, the court must consider "how reasonable jurors
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could have understood the charge as a whole."

State v. Gonzales,

822 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). 7
A deconstructive analysis of the text gives insight into how
reasonable jurors could have understood this instruction.
A deconstructive analysis of textual discourse focuses
upon the ambiguities and or contradictions that a text exhibits
in terms of its intended meaning.

In fact, deconstruction is

interested in the way the text subverts itself in terms of its
consciously intended meanings, and may be shown to exhibit
messages or assumptions which may not be intended, but are
nonetheless communicated.8

A careful analysis of the way this

instruction is constructed and phrased reveals a bias against the
defendant.
The subtext of Sentence 2 presumes the guilt of the
defendant and implies that his guilt need only be shown to the
satisfaction of the jury.

Sentence 2 states, "And, in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt
he is entitled to an acquittal."

is satisfactorily

shown,

The main portion of the

7

Gonzales adopted the standard of review in
Cage v.
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40, 112 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1990).
The
Supreme Court has since reviewed challenges to jury instructions to
determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the
Constitution." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S. Ct. 475,
116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399 (1991). Issues of standard of review are a
matter of state law. Absent a direct federal mandate, Utah courts
are not bound by federal standards of review. State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256, 1268 (Utah 1993).
8

See Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, Theory and
Criticism After Structuralism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
New York, 1982).
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sentence, "And in case of a reasonable doubt he is entitled to an
acquittal" is modified by the phrase shown in italics.
sentence is straightforward enough.

However, the modifying

phrase presumes the defendant is guilty.
assumes that guilt exists.

The main

The phrase "his guilt"

To "show" means to reveal or

demonstrate something known, but hidden or not obvious.

The

phrase, "whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown" suggests that
it is the State's burden to merely satisfactorily show what the
State already knows, that the defendant is guilty.
the State need only

Additionally,

demonstrate to the jury's "satisfaction"

that the defendant is guilty.
Sentence 4, "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require proof to an absolute certainty" is also misleading.
Though a correct statement of the law, the placement of this
statement in the reasonable doubt instruction minimizes the
importance of reasonable doubt to the defendant.

Immediately

after telling the jury that the burden of proof lies with the
State, the instruction

does not convey to the jury that the

benefit of uncertainty should go to the defendant, but instead
talks about the level of doubt the State is entitled to have.
Sentence 4 appears to give the benefit of doubt to the State and
not the defendant.

Sentence 4 tells the jury that the proof or

evidence that the State offers does not have to be absolutely
certain.

The implied suggestion is that the State has the

benefit of a degree of doubt as to the certainty of its proof.
The purpose of a reasonable doubt instruction is to inform the
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jury that uncertainty or doubt goes to the benefit of the
defendant.

The placement of this statement at the beginning of

the instruction undermines that purpose to the detriment of the
defendant.

Jurors are told that the defendant is entitled to

acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Then

in the next breath they are told that if they are not absolutely
certain of the defendant's guilt, they can still convict.
Lastly, the structure of the text is dedicated to
limiting the application of the concept of reasonable doubt.

The

text narrows the definition of reasonable doubt almost to the
point of non-existence.

The text begins by telling the jury that

the defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, (sentence 1 & 3 ) .

The text then begins to

narrow the definition of reasonable doubt by telling the jury
everything that reasonable doubt is not.

Sentence 4 tells the

jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not absolute
certainty.

Sentence 6 states that reasonable doubt is not

fanciful, is not imaginary and is not based wholly on
speculation.

The only sentences that attempt to affirmatively

define reasonable doubt are hopelessly circular in their logic.
Sentences 5, 7 and 8, in essence, tell the jury that reasonable
doubt is a doubt which is reasonable.
The entire explanation of the concept of reasonable doubt
is framed in the negative.

This negative framing narrows the

definition of reasonable doubt as the reader goes through the
text.

The text limits the application of reasonable doubt like a
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funnel, to the degree that the reader begins to question whether
reasonable doubt even exists.

The structure of the text

discourages the jury from attempting to apply the concept and
suggests that it has a very narrow meaning and application.
The reasonable doubt instruction is the "prime
instruction for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error."

Cage, 498 U.S. at 40.

Cage implicitly supports

the argument that "reasonable doubt" is not self-defining since
the Court rejected the Cage instruction despite repeated usage of
the term "reasonable doubt."

At worst, Instruction 6 presumes

guilt and lowers the State's burden of proof.

At best, it is

confusing and fails completely to give the jury guidance or a
workable definition of reasonable doubt.
The trial court must adequately define the concept of
reasonable doubt.

Failure to do so is error.

For that reason,

the trial court should have provided the jury with Loretto's
reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction.

State v. James,

819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) held that the reasonable alternative
hypothesis instruction was simply another way of expressing the
concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jd. at 799.

Implicit in James is the understanding that if the concept of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not adequately defined, the
defendant may be entitled to an alternative instruction.
Loretto recognizes that this Court has approved the
reasonable doubt instruction given in this case in State v.
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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See also Gonzales,

822 P.2d at 1218; State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

Even if the reasonable doubt instruction does not violate

constitutional requirements, it is so poorly drafted that a
reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction should have been
given to the jury.

See Haston, 811 P.2d at 932 (this reasonable

doubt instruction is "not a model of lucidity and simplicity").
Loretto maintains that the reasonable doubt instruction
in this case is biased against the defendant.

The subtext of the

instruction, when taken as a whole, could easily be understood by
reasonable jurors to minimize the importance of reasonable doubt,
lower the State's burden of proof and imply that there is a
presumption of guilt.

Instruction 6 contains an underlying bias

which subverts the intended meaning of the text and sends a
message that reasonable doubt is a very narrow and limited
concept, and that proof which is "satisfactory" is sufficient to
convict.
Cage considered the instruction as a whole.

The Court

rejected the argument that the offending statements were harmless
when viewed in the context of the entire instruction.

The giving

of a constitutionally defective reasonable doubt instruction
requires reversal.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113

S.Ct. 2078 (1993).

Loretto is entitled to new trial.

A case

based on circumstantial evidence of accomplice liability
illustrates the importance of an adequate reasonable doubt
instruction.

Had the jury been given a sufficient reasonable
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doubt instruction, or a reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction, the jury may have acquitted him.
Pedersen approved of the instruction because it did not
contain the problematic language identified in State v. Johnson,
774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989).

However, the problems Loretto has

identified with the instruction were not specifically addressed
in Pedersen and its progeny.

To the extent that Loretto's

argument is inconsistent with Pedersen and subsequent cases, he
respectfully requests this Court reconsider its holding in
Pedersen.
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO
GRANT THE APPELLANT A CONTINUANCE SO COUNSEL
COULD ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE CASE BY
INTERVIEWING A POTENTIAL DEFENSE WITNESS.
Five days prior to trial, defense counsel requested a
continuance so as to follow up on a new lead to locate a
potential defense witness.

R. 191.

once before at the State's request.

The trial had been continued
R. 77-80.

The record shows

the following discussion took place:
THE COURT: This is on for a pretrial conference.
Are you ready to go to trial?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Quite frankly, we're not, Your
Honor. We're still trying to find a witness.
Your Honor, we've found a lead and trying to
locate him. We have the name and phone number of
somebody who we believe knows this witness that
we're looking for. And we have left messages
with that person, but have not received any
return phone calls yet. We don't have an address
for the friend of the witness so we can't go
there and look for him. We are just simply
relying on making the phone calls and hoping that
he is going to call back. We are hoping that
we'll be able to find this witness and because
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we've not been able to make contact with that
witness yet we are not prepared for trial, and
would ask the court to continue the matter, and
allow us a little more time to try and locate
him. Just recently gotten the phone number for
the friend. We have been previously trying to
find a witness but without any further
information about who he is associated with it
has been difficult.
R. 192.

The State indicated that it was ready to proceed, and

had subpoenaed an out of state witness.

The State did not oppose

nor stipulate to defense counsel's motion to continue.

R. 193.

Defense counsel was naturally unable to make a proffer as to what
the witness's testimony would be, as she had been unable to
contact him.

R. 193.

When moving for a continuance, the moving party
must show that denial of the motion will prevent
the party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks
can be produced within a reasonable time, and
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing
for the case before requesting the continuance.
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The court abused it discretion by refusing to give
counsel additional time to adequately investigate the case.

An

essential component of procedural due process is the right of the
accused to have an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense.9
State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983).

Trial

counsel has a duty to investigate the facts of the case,

9

. Due process of law is guaranteed by Article I section 7 of
the Utah Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.
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interview prospective defense witnesses, and procure defense
witnesses.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) .

Counsel must interview a potential defense witness before a
reasonable decision can be made whether or not to call the
witness at trial.

Id.

The trial court's refusal to grant defense counsel's
request for a continuance prevented her from performing her duty
to her client to adequately prepare his case for trial.
constituted an abuse of discretion.

This

"Abuse of discretion may be

found where a party has made timely objections, given necessary
notice and made a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset
for good cause."
1982).

State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah

Counsel made her request five days before trial.

Counsel had only recently received new information that would
assist her in locating the witness.

Her failure to interview the

witness prior to her request for a continuance was not as a
result of her failure to exercise due diligence, and her request
for the continuance was timely.

While the State may have been

inconvenienced by a continuance, the State did not claim that it
would be prejudiced.

R. 193.

See, Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 413

(denial of continuance not an abuse of discretion where the State
indicated that a delay may hamper its ability to produce its
witnesses).
Without adequate time to locate and interview the
witness, counsel could not proffer what the testimony of the
witness would be at trial.

And yet because counsel could not
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say if the witness's testimony would be material or admissible,
the court denied the request for more time.

R. 192-93.

Confidence in an adversarial system of criminal justice can only
be had when the defendant is given every opportunity to present
evidence in his behalf.

Loretto was prejudiced by the court's

refusal to allow him adequate time to investigate all potential
defense witnesses.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the Appellant respectfully
requests this Court reverse his conviction for insufficient
evidence.

In the alternative, Appellant requests this Court

reverse his conviction and remand with orders for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this JiL±L

day of
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, 1996

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMF.isrnitfTr^rr

*7TT

AMENDMENTS

A m e n d . XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship —• Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors.
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Civil actions, right to
jury trial in, U.R.C.P., Rules 38, 39.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abatement of nuisance.
Capital cases.
Civil cases.
—Nature of issue.
Concurrence of three-fourths of jurors.
Consolidation of actions.
Guilty plea.
Judge's abrogation of jury's function.
Jury selection.
Injunction.
Nonsuit.

Number of jurors.
Paternity proceedings.
Request for jury trial.
Reversal of verdict.
Unanimous verdict.
Waiver of jury trial.
Abatement of nuisance.
Former section regarding abatement of
brothel as nuisance, insofar as it provided for
imprisonment and authorized court in equity
proceedings to impose jail sentence, held unconstitutional as violating this section. State
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76-2-202.

Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.

Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
History. C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-202.
Cross-References. — Aiding violation of

27

Wildlife Resources Code, § 23-20-23.
Obstructing justice, § 76-8-306.

PART 3
ROBBERY
76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-301.

Cross-References. —Assault, § 76-5-102.
Attempt, § 76-4-101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
A ..

A

Attempt.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
—Testimony.
Intent.

Taking of property.
Threats.
Cited

Attempt
Trial court's failure to instruct that in order
to convict of attempted robbery the jury must
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
188

ADDENDUM B

1

point.)

2
3

THE COURT:

All right.

All right.

Well, <amy

objection if the juror is excused?

4

MS. REMAL:

No objection.

5

THE COURT:

Mrs • Bingham, we111 excuse you as

6

well.

Thank you very much for being here.

7

(Whereupon, Mrs. Bingham left the courtroom.)

8

THE COURT:

9

Rowland.

10

MR. ROWLAND :

11

Jordan.

12

not married.

13
14

Let' s forge ahead with Mr. Bart

I am Bart Rowland, living in West

I work at a ,silk screening, printing shirts and I'm
No kids, and that's it.

THE COURT:

Okay.

And do you belong to any clubs

or organizations?

15

MR. ROWLAND:

16

THE COURT:

No.

Mr. Rowland, do you take any

17

publications, newspapers, magazines or anything of that

18

nature?

19

MR. ROWLAND:

20

THE COURT:

21

No.

I don't.

And tell us, what about your

education, if you would.

22

MR. ROWLAND:

23

not obtained my G.E.D.

24

THE COURT:

25

Ms. Castillo?

Ifve got--went to Grade 12 but have

Thank you very much.

18

1
2

like this.

appearance and I think what—

3

THE COURT:

4

7

10
11
12

15
16
17
18
19

Miss him so bad.

Do you think that it would be

difficult for you to sit through this trial and concentrate
on these issues?
MS. BINGHAM:

It would be. One is a young man who

is my son's build and everything.
really hard.

Just hard.

Just really,

Hopefully we won't have to talk about our kids

just right here (indicating).

I don't want to do this. I

don't know what I want to do.

13
14

September.

THE COURT:

8
9

HOW long ago did this occur?

MS. BINGHAM:

5
6

I am prejudiced because I just look at his

THE COURT:

Uh huh.

This will be the last time

you would have to discuss your children at all and then you
would be required to just serve, listen to all of the
evidence, probably take about two days, concentrate on it
and determine whether or not the State had met their burden
and proved their case.

Do you think you could do that or

would there be emotional pressure if you were doing that?

20

MS. BINGHAM:

I'm a very emotional person.

We

21

live next door to a Mexican.

22

and he—he dressed just like he did.

23

Why can't he shave that thing off the back of his head?

24

sorry.

25

Still upset at them in gangs
I can't understand.
I'm

I don't know if I could be fair.
(The jury was referring to the defendant at this
17

tomorrow.

Is that right, Counsel?
MS. REMAL:

I believe so, yes.

THE COURT:

We'll be here tomorrow afternoon in

this trial.

And I assume that that would interfere with

your high school graduation.
MS. DRAPER:
THE COURT:

I think it would.
Which high school is it?

MS. DRAPER:
THE COURT:

He is at Hunter High School.
And this is beginning at 2:30, did you

say?
MS. DRAPER:

We're supposed to meet at 2:00

o'clock as a family to go there.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have any objection

if this witness—this juror is excused?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

No, your Honor.

MS. REMAL:

Nor do I.

THE COURT:

Rather than put you through the rest

of this ordeal, we'll just excuse you at thi s time and you
are now free to leave »

MS. DRAPER:
MS. BINGHAM :
suicide.

Thank you.
I am Helen Bingham.

I lost a son to

I am prejudiced when I see a youngl man.

thinking of my son, Monty.
about my kids
basket case.

I keep

You wanted—you asked me to talk

That's a little hard.

I am an emotional

Gosh, I wish my son was here, even if it was

16

Members of the jury, I thank you for your
patience.

It took a little longer than we had anticipated.
I have one final question I would like to ask each]

of you.

Do you recall Mrs. Helen Bingham, Juror No. 3, who

had had a recent suicide in her family, who was quite
emotional as she responded to some of my questions.
And Mrs. Bingham made some comments about some
personal prejudices in connection with this case.

And

perhaps that could be interpreted by some that way, not
entirely clear, but she mentioned various things that
concerned her about this case and in connection with the
defendant in this case.
Anyone here who feels that they were influenced byl
those comments of Mrs. Bingham in any way that would make it
difficult for them to be fair and impartial, based upon her
comments?

Anyone?

No response.

Anything else, Counsel?

is.

Mr. Tanner?

Yes.

MR. TANNER:

I misunderstood what your question

I did put in two six-months period in the jury about 34j

years ago.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

And was that a

criminal case or a civil case?
MR. TANNER:
THE COURT:

Civil.
Civil case?

Do you recall if you
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ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.

( ^

Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished

by means

of

force or fear.

A

person commits

aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, that
person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or causes
serious bodily injury upon another.

INSTRUCTION NO.

1^

Before you can convict the defendant, Gilbert Loretto, Jr.,
of

the

offense

of

Aggravated

Robbery

as

charged

in

the

information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1.

That on or about the 10th day of January, 1995, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gilbert Loretto, Jr.,
as a party took personal property then in the possession of Keri
Flores, from the person or immediate presence of Keri Flores; and
2.

That such taking was unlawful; and

3.

That such taking was intentional; and

4.

That such taking was against the will of Keri Flores;

5.

That such taking was accomplished by means of force or

and

fear; and
6.

That

in

the

course

of

committing

such

taking,

a

dangerous weapon was used.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged
in the information.

If, on the other hand, you are not convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.

\j
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